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ABSTRACT
Objective Doctor absenteeism is widespread in Bangladesh, 
and the perspectives of the actors involved are insufficiently 
understood. This paper sought to elicit preferences of doctors 
over aspects of jobs in rural areas in Bangladesh that can help 
to inform the development of packages of policy interventions 
that may persuade them to stay at their posts.
Methods We conducted a discrete choice experiment with 
308 doctors across four hospitals in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
Four attributes of rural postings were included based on 
a literature review, qualitative research and a consensus- 
building workshop with policymakers and key health- 
system stakeholders: relationship with the community, 
security measures, attendance- based policies and 
incentive payments. Respondents’ choices were analysed 
with mixed multinomial logistic and latent class models 
and were used to simulate the likely uptake of jobs under 
different policy packages.
Results All attributes significantly impacted doctor choices 
(p<0.01). Doctors strongly preferred jobs at rural facilities 
where there was a supportive relationship with the community 
(β=0.93), considered good attendance in education and 
training (0.77) or promotion decisions (0.67), with functional 
security (0.67) and higher incentive payments (0.5 per 10% 
increase of base salary). Jobs with disciplinary action for poor 
attendance were disliked by respondents (−0.63). Latent class 
analysis identified three groups of doctors who differed in 
their uptake of jobs. Scenario modelling identified intervention 
packages that differentially impacted doctor behaviour and 
combinations that could feasibly improve doctors’ attendance.
Conclusion Bangladeshi doctors have strong but varied 
preferences over interventions to overcome absenteeism. We 
generated evidence suggesting that interventions considering 
the perspective of the doctors themselves could result in 
substantial reductions in absenteeism. Designing policy 
packages that take account of the different situations facing 
doctors could begin to improve their ability and motivation to 
be present at their job and generate sustainable solutions to 
absenteeism in rural Bangladesh.
INTRODUCTION
Health worker absenteeism is widespread in 
many low- income and middle- income coun-
tries and is a major obstacle to achieving 
universal health coverage as it disproportion-
ately affects vulnerable groups.1–3 In Bang-
ladesh, absenteeism is a particular problem 
among doctors. Although data are scarce, it 
has been estimated that 40% of doctors are 
absent from their posts at one any time, and, 
when a facility is staffed by a single doctor as 
is often the case in rural areas with under-
served communities, absenteeism can be as 
high as 74%.3 Traditionally, research on rule 
breaking has been dominated by frameworks 
based on neoclassical economic formulations 
of behaviour change that see absenteeism as 
a result of poor governance and is prone to 
moralising descriptions of those who violate 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Doctor absenteeism is a widespread and pervasive 
problem in Bangladesh, limiting access to care and 
reducing the impact of health expenditure.
 ► There is limited evidence of successful interventions 
to overcome the problem and traditional approaches 
focusing on increased monitoring and enforcement 
of sanctions for absent doctors have not had sus-
tained impact doctor attendance.
What are the new findings?
 ► Through a novel application of a discrete choice ex-
periment, we elicited doctor preferences over key 
drivers of absenteeism and potential policy inter-
ventions and identified how this varied across our 
sample.
 ► We identify a subset of doctors who appear suscep-
tible to behaviour change through feasible levels of 
policy intervention.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► By incorporating the preferences of this subset of 
doctors into policy design and addressing the key 
drivers of absenteeism, feasible and pragmatic 
packages of interventions can be developed likely to 
reduce absenteeism across the system.
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contracts as profit- maximising opportunists who seek to 
exploit weaknesses in the system. From this viewpoint, 
interventions developed to overcome absenteeism have 
focused on formal, technical fixes (government poli-
cies and institutional and organisational reform often 
aimed at improving oversight or punishment for rule- 
breakers).4 In Bangladesh, for example, the Government 
has responded to the widespread absenteeism of doctors 
by installing fingerprint scanners to verify attendance 
by health workers in rural health clinics and publishes 
attendance rates online to expose and punish indi-
vidual providers.5These approaches reproduce standard 
‘anticorruption’ approaches to public sector rule viola-
tions to address the problem of absenteeism but have 
not delivered good results. This is because they do not 
account for the prevailing social and political context 
driving the behaviour. There is limited evidence of the 
positive impact of such measures on absenteeism in 
Bangladesh,6–9 reflecting a lack of evidence for similar 
approaches globally.7
Recent frameworks developed to investigate rule- 
breaking in other sectors may offer a new way forward to 
address health worker absenteeism.10 Through this new 
approach, we seek to recast absenteeism as a structural 
rather than moral issue with increased recognition of 
broader systemic factors driving doctor absenteeism,4 11 
to develop, as Gaitonde et al call for, ‘locally tailored inter-
ventions born from a deeper understanding of local 
dynamics rather than focus on solutions that are universal 
or up- scalable’.7 Through qualitative research with junior 
doctors in Bangladesh, we found doctors often found 
rural facilities to be dangerous and difficult to work in.4 
The high burden of work (exacerbated by absenteeism 
across the system) undermined their time to study for 
professional examinations and poor relationships with 
local communities made working hours stressful and 
sometimes frightening. Housing was often described as 
inadequate, sometimes non- existent and transport diffi-
cult, and for female doctors both dangerous and stressful. 
Doctors were found to be differentially able to be absent 
without sanction. For those who were well connected 
politically, it was relatively easy to leave a rural area and 
get a placement elsewhere. These doctors would be offi-
cially absent and then be officially relocated. For those 
who had weaker political connections, a considerable 
amount of time was spent absent from the health facility 
seeking support to be relocated. Those with no political 
connections were the ones who were mostly at the health 
facilities as they had no network to draw on and no scope 
to leave the rural area that they were placed in.
In this context, where absenteeism is widespread, top- 
down measures to enforce adherence to health system 
arrangements (eg, their contracts to work in rural areas) 
are ineffective, and enhanced enforcement would be 
risky as some junior doctors may leave the profession in 
even higher numbers leading to gaps in delivery. Further, 
such strategies represent large investments from scarce 
health budgets being directed to uses with limited impact 
on population health. In contrast, identifying the most 
profound structural drivers of doctor absenteeism could 
inform strategies that would induce and enable most 
doctors to be at their place of employment in rural areas. 
Targeted interventions to encourage and enable those 
who wish to be present at their posts but find it too chal-
lenging would leave a much smaller group who would 
continue to be absent. This minority could be addressed 
in other ways. In other sectors, when these supportive 
set of policies are in place, they have made space for 
novel forms of collective action to emerge and hori-
zontal approaches to regulation where the rule- following 
majority becomes involved in peer- monitoring. We 
have described this type of strategy, which relies on first 
creating conditions that reduce reasons for rule breaking 
and then creates novel forms of horizontal governance as 
designing for differences.12
Developing appropriate strategies requires an under-
standing of the determinants of absenteeism, doctors’ 
preferences over different components of their job and 
trade- offs they would be willing to make between them. 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) offer a means to do 
so and they have been shown to be useful for informing 
policies in a range of areas including health worker moti-
vation and retention in many countries.13 While context 
specific, these studies have generally shown the impor-
tance that health workers place on improved work condi-
tions and benefits, such as bonus payments, promotion 
or educational opportunities and show that they are 
generally willing to accept certain undesirable job char-
acteristics if balanced by positive ones that they value.
METHODS
We used a DCE to assess preferences of doctors in regard 
to determinants of absenteeism in rural facilities in 
Bangladesh and to identify areas for potential interven-
tion. This study was conducted by the Anti- Corruption 
Evidence Research Consortium (SOAS- ACE) which 
works in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Tanzania. This compo-
nent forms part of a mixed- methods study examining 
doctor absenteeism in rural Bangladesh (2017–2019).
Attribute development
As recommended in the literature,14 15 DCE attributes 
were developed through a multistage, mixed- methods 
process including literature review, qualitative interviews 
and consensus- building workshops with policymakers 
and health- system stakeholders. The review examined 
measures to address absenteeism in South and South- 
East Asia.9 This informed qualitative interviews with a 
purposively selected sample of 30 doctors who work or 
have recently worked in rural facilities, to explore their 
perceptions of what drives absenteeism and their views 
on potential solutions. Emerging themes informed attrib-
utes for the experiment, which were iteratively refined 
into nine candidate attributes presented to policymakers 
and clinicians working in the Bangladeshi health system. 
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Participants in a consensus- building workshop were 
asked whether the attributes and levels depicted real-
istic options and their relative policy importance. From 
this process, six attributes were included in the pilot 
DCE (table 1). We theorised that doctors would accept 
greater monitoring and measures intended to manage 
absenteeism if accompanied by greater opportunities 
or improvements in community relationships, personal 
security or rewards for good attendance.
Piloting
Given this study’s sensitivity and novelty, the question-
naire was piloted over two rounds among 15 doctors at 
two tertiary hospitals in Dhaka to ensure acceptability, 
appropriateness and understandability of the ques-
tionnaire. This was followed by short interviews where 
respondents were asked for feedback on the questions 
and process. In light of feedback, the number of attrib-
utes and levels were reduced to the final four outlined 
in table 2 and slight changes were made to the way the 
scenarios were presented.
DCE design
The hypothetical choice sets for DCE were designed 
using Ngene software V.1.2.1. We specified a d- efficient, 
fractional factorial design using a multinomial logit 
model. No interaction terms were specified in the design. 
Estimated coefficients for each level were derived from 
pilot data and used as prior estimates to generate the 
final survey tool. The final survey consisted of 12 unla-
belled choice sets, asking participants to choose between 
two hypothetical jobs that varied in levels of the attrib-
utes outlined in table 2. A two- stage question format was 
used to ensure some preference data were collected, 
while also enabling participants to opt out of accepting 
the job presented to avoid overestimation of preferences 
(figure 1).16 17 Figure 1 shows an example of the choice 
scenario in English although the final questionnaire was 
translated into Bengali.
Data collection and sample size
The DCE was conducted in 2019 on doctors currently 
working at four tertiary hospitals in Dhaka with experi-
ence of working at rural facilities within the past 10 years 
Table 1 Candidate attributes included in pilot study and reason for inclusion
Attribute Reason for inclusion Propositions
Relationship between 
the doctor and the local 
community
Qualitative work highlighted that the doctors felt 
that having a good relationship with the community 
was the key determinant of how manageable the 
demands placed on them were. Further, many noted 
that if there was a good relationship, it would be 
unlikely that there would be security issues.
Doctors expected to prefer facilities 
that enabled a strong relationship with 
powerful individuals within the community.
Safety at workplace Security was found to be a concern to the doctors 
both at workplace and living place. Many facilities 
did not have appropriate or functional security 
measures while many interviewees told of situations 
where they had either been verbally or physically 
abused while in the workplace.
Doctors expected to prefer facilities with 
effective security measures.
Workload Many doctors reported that due to high numbers 
of patients, staff shortages and social pressures 
from the local community, they found their workload 
unmanageable and outside of their control.
Doctors expected to prefer facilities with 
better workload management practices.
Monitoring absenteeism Doctors reported that monitoring mechanisms were 
often either non- functional or inconvenient to use 
(eg, having to sign in at central locations away from 
the facility).
Doctors expected to prefer facilities with 
either minimal or efficient monitoring 
systems.
Policies to address 
absenteeism
Doctors reported that policies to control absenteeism 
were often not enforced and findings from the 
literature suggest that there is limited evidence of 
successful interventions to overcome absenteeism.
Doctors expected to prefer facilities 
that reward good attendance. Punitive 
measures were expected to be disliked by 
most doctors although some noted that 
appropriate enforcement would reduce 
absenteeism and thus their personal 
workload.
Incentive for working in 
rural facility
Incentive payments are used in the Bangladesh 
health system to encourage doctors to work in 
the Hills districts and would thus be familiar to 
doctors and allow for a numerical assessment of the 
importance of attributes.
Doctors expected to prefer higher 
incentive payments.
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(mean total rural posting was 3 years, range: 1–12 years). 
Researchers explained the study, read the introductory 
statement, explained the job sets and went through a prac-
tice question with all participants. Given the sensitivity of 
the topic, often several visits were required to provide 
additional explanations and reassure the respondents; 
this approach significantly improved the response rate. 
The team implemented procedures to maintain quality 
and rigour. Methods for calculating the required sample 
sizes for DCEs are contested in the literature.18 While 
there is no precise power calculation for DCEs, given our 
intent to conduct latent class analysis with our data, we 
targeted a sample size of at least 300 to ensure sufficient 
power to examine differences across groups.19 This was 
in line with previous published DCEs in similar cohorts, 
including those using latent class analysis.19–22
Analysis
DCEs are theoretically based on random utility theory 
where independent rational actors act to maximise their 
individual utility;23 we assume participants chose the job 
that maximises their individual benefit or utility, which 
depends on the attributes included in the experiment 
(online supplemental appendix). For the opt- out choice, 
all attributes were coded as 0. Two models were estimated, 
the first using panel mixed multinomial logit methods to 
estimate preferences across all participants, and second, 
latent class analysis to investigate heterogeneity in pref-
erences across our sample. This was to test our hypoth-
esis that incentives will differ significantly for different 
groups such that some doctors will never accept to work 
in rural areas. In contrast, others may choose to stay if the 
Table 2 Final attributes and levels used in discrete choice experiment
Attribute Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Relationship 
between the doctor 





Supportive relationship with 
community, for example, 
monthly meetings of doctors, 
administrators, community 
leaders
    
Safety at workplace No active dedicated 
security guard and 
functional CCTV
Active dedicated security guard 
and functional CCTV
    
Career path based 
on attendance
Disciplinary action, for 
example, salary cut, for 
poor attendance
Good attendance does not lead 
to any further benefit
Good attendance 
taken into account 
for promotion and 
transfer
Good attendance 
rewarded by bonus 




working in rural 
facility
No additional financial 
incentive for posting
Incentive payment of 15% of 
basic salary for posting
Incentive payment of 
30% of basic salary 
for posting
  
Figure 1 Example choice set presented to respondents.
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right mix of benefits is offered, thus informing interven-
tions targeting this group.4 Unforced choice data (with 
options coded as A, B or neither job) were used for all 
analysis with the respondents’ choices as the dependent 
variable.17 24 All attribute levels were effects coded and, 
in the mixed model, all parameters were modelled as 
random with a normal distribution. Constant terms were 
included to depict respondent preference to not accept 
either presented job. A three- class model was used in the 
latent class analysis as model fit statistics showed minimal 
gains from more classes, the authors’ assessed a three- 
class model as the most appropriate to interpret the data 
and class sizes becoming too small for meaningful inter-
pretation for larger class models (online supplemental 
appendix).19 Estimated probabilities were used to assign 
respondents to groups (with participants assigned to the 
group with the highest probability of membership) to 
examine characteristics associated with each group.
A willingness to pay analysis was conducted to estimate 
the notional amount of incentive payment that respon-
dents would be willing to sacrifice (as a percentage of 
their base salary) to gain access to different levels of the 
attributes. Finally, we modelled the potential impact of 
different policy packages on the probability of accepting 
a rural job first for the entire sample and then for each 
identified latent class. All analyses were conducted using 
NLOGIT software V.6.0).
Patient and public involvement
This research was done without patient involvement due 
to the subject area and methods chosen (which were 
focused on the doctors’ own preferences and choices). 
Patients were not invited to comment on the study design, 
interpret the results or to contribute to the writing or 
editing of this document for readability or accuracy.
RESULTS
General characteristics
The general characteristics of respondents are summa-
rised in table 3. In total, 308 doctors completed the 
DCE, almost all of whom were married (92%), 46% 
were female, 76% were aged under 35% and 14% had 
completed postgraduate training.
Predictors of choice for the entire sample
The results of the mixed multinomial logit model 
are presented in table 4. All attributes significantly 
predicted the choices of participants. The constant for 
not accepting either job was the largest predictor of 
respondents’ choice, suggesting that respondents would 
only accept a job if it included a suitable set of attrib-
utes (across all choices respondents opted- out 41% of 
the time). The presence of a supportive relationship with 
the community was the most preferred attribute across 
the sample, followed by bonus points in the competition 
for subsequent places in further education or training, 
consideration of good attendance in promotion and 
transfer decisions and personal security. Respondents 
preferred higher incentive payments but the willingness 
to pay analysis (table 4) shows a willingness to sacrifice 
higher payments in exchange for other positive attrib-
utes. The presence of the disciplinary attribute where 
poor attendance was punished by a salary cut was signifi-
cantly disliked by respondents. The random parameters’ 
estimated SD showed significant heterogeneity in prefer-
ences for attributes across the sample except for the two 
attributes relating to rewards for good attendance that 
appear to be universally preferred.
Latent class analysis
The latent class analysis identified three quite different 
groups with distinct preferences (table 5), with the 
most striking difference evident with the constant 
depicting whether a doctor took a job presented. Group 
1 (accounting for 19.8% of our sample), who we have 
named Resisters, were extremely unlikely to take any job 
offered, regardless of the attribute levels presented, while 
Group 2 (32.1%), Acceptors, were unlikely to reject a job 
presented. Group 3 (48.1%), Traders, generally preferred 
to not accept the job presented, however, the size of this 
effect was much smaller than for the Resisters and so could 
be balanced out by the impact of the presented attributes. 
Estimated background characteristics of latent classes are 
shown in online supplemental appendix.
Policy simulations
Figure 2 shows how the overall sample and latent groups 
identified are predicted to respond to different policy 
packages. Under the baseline scenario, 45.3% of doctors 
were predicted to accept the job offered, slightly higher 
Table 3 General characteristics of cohort
Respondent characteristics N %
Total respondents 308 100
Age
  30 or less than 30 57 18.5
  31–35 178 57.8
  36–40 42 13.6
  41 and above 31 10.1
Female 143 46.4
Married 283 91.9
Completed postgraduate training 43 14.0
Reported that they felt physically unsafe in 
previous rural posting
215 73.1
Reported any challenge in previous posting 297 96.4
Reported having access to important people in case of 
transfer or training
  Yes, always 75 24.4
  Yes, occasionally/in exceptional 
circumstances
135 44.0
  No 97 31.6
Member of a professional association 225 74.0
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than if the only intervention enacted is punishment for 
poor attendance (44.7%). If punishment for poor attend-
ance is accompanied by a supportive community and 
secure facility, this proportion grows to 58.7% and 63.9% 
if good attendance is also rewarded by bonus points for 
placement in further education. Under the conditions 
Table 4 Results mixed multinomial logit model for full sample
Variable Coefficient SE P value
Willingness to pay (as a % 
payment of base salary)
Constant for not accepting either job 1.25* 0.14 <0.01 NA
Supportive community 0.93* 0.05 <0.01 16% (12.4–19.7)
Presence of security 0.67* 0.05 <0.01 12.3% (10.2–14.3)
Disciplinary action for poor attendance −0.63* 0.06 <0.01 −12.9% (−11.8 to −13.9)
Good attendance considered in promotion and transfer 
decisions
0.67* 0.06 <0.01 13.5% (12.3–14.7)
Good attendance rewarded with bonus points for placement 
in higher education or training
0.77* 0.06 <0.01 16% (14.8–17)
Incentive payment for posting (per 1% of base salary) 0.05* 0.00 <0.01 NA
Estimated SD for random parameters
Constant for not accepting either job 2.6* 0.16 <0.01 NA
Supportive community 0.6* 0.05 <0.01 NA
Presence of security 0.53* 0.05 <0.01 NA
Disciplinary action for poor attendance 0.27* 0.10 <0.01 NA
Good attendance considered in promotion and transfer 
decisions
0.2† 0.11 0.06 NA
Good attendance rewarded with bonus points for placement 
in higher education or training
0.25† 0.14 0.07 NA
Incentive payment for posting (per 1% of base salary) 0.03* 0.00 <0.01 NA
*p<0.05
†p<0.1
Table 5 Results of latent class analysis
Variable
Group 1%–19.8% of sample Group 2%–32.1% of sample Group 3%–48.1% of sample
β SE P value β SE P value β SE P value
Constant for not 
accepting either job
4.47‡ 0.61 <0.01 −1.75‡ 0.21 <0.01 1.5‡ 0.11 <0.01
Supportive community 1.56‡ 0.38 <0.01 0.59‡ 0.06 <0.01 0.8‡ 0.06 <0.01
Presence of security 0.62‡ 0.18 <0.01 0.43‡ 0.04 <0.01 0.58‡ 0.05 <0.01
Disciplinary action for 
poor attendance
0.059 0.28 0.85 −0.50‡ 0.09 <0.01 −0.61‡ 0.09 <0.01
Good attendance 
considered in promotion 
and transfer decisions
0.93‡ 0.33 0.01 0.38‡ 0.08 <0.01 0.64‡ 0.08 <0.01
Good attendance 
rewarded with bonus 
points for placement 
in higher education or 
training
−0.07 0.49 0.88 0.64‡ 0.09 <0.01 0.74‡ 0.08 <0.01
Incentive payment for 
posting (per 1% of base 
salary)
0.05‡ 0.02 <0.01 0.04‡ <0.01 <0.01 0.05‡ <0.01 <0.01
McFaddens’ Pseudo R2=0.25, AIC=6165.6, AICc=6331.5.
*, ‡ indicate statistical significance at p=0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
NA, not applicable.
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most preferred by doctors, with no punishment accom-
panied by rewards for good attendance and a 30% incen-
tive payment, 83.4% of doctors would choose to accept 
a job in a rural facility. While the Acceptors were consist-
ently more likely to accept a rural job, the proportions 
of Resisters and Traders were dependent on the specific 
policy combinations presented. In all but the most attrac-
tive scenario, the percentage of doctors in the Resisters 
accepting a rural posting never rises above 50%.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Health worker absenteeism is increasingly recognised as 
a major impediment to accessible and effective health-
care in LMICs.25 26 It is described by Transparency 
International Bangladesh as part of the ‘corruption 
and irregularities’ that adversely affect citizens seeking 
healthcare and contributes to widespread mistrust that 
sees the health sector repeatedly ranked as among the 
most corrupt in Bangladesh and around the world.27 28 
Recognising this harm, there is support for addressing 
or preventing absenteeism—traditionally using legal 
or regulatory mechanisms that have viewed it through 
an often moralistic lens that sees absenteeism as rule- 
breaking that emerges from ungoverned spaces where 
actors seek to maximise their gain by seeking to exploit 
weaknesses in the system. However, evidence on the effec-
tiveness of the strategies used to reduce rule breaking 
and support health system functioning is scarce. As a 
consequence, there is an ongoing misalignment between 
official policy and realities of activities on the ground 
where much absenteeism may be driven by reflect diffi-
cult working conditions and survival strategies employed 
by the providers as well as deliberate rule- breaking for 
private gain.
Recent approaches have sought to examine what can 
be done beyond sanctions and crude monitoring which 
have been seen to be easy to bypass, instead examining 
changing the incentives of those who break or ignore 
the rules. In a recent paper in this journal, we proposed 
a nuanced new approach drawing on ‘developmental 
governance’4 which helps to examine the sociopolit-
ical context in which these rule breaking (or corrupt) 
behaviours occur. An understanding of this context and 
the organisational context of the health systems can 
inform the development of sociopolitically attuned inter-
ventions that can gain the support of key local actors.7 
The first step is to understand the viewpoint of doctors 
and the conditions under which they would be able and 
willing to abide the rules.
We investigated doctors’ preferences regarding 
determinants of absenteeism in Bangladesh. The 
most important finding is that there are significant 
differences in preferences and therefore in the likely 
response to incentives and sanctions across three 
groups of doctors. This finding is important for 
informing the development of a package of feasible 
interventions to overcome absenteeism. We estimated 
the potential impact of different interventions on 
doctors’ behaviour, highlighting the importance of 
moving beyond traditional top- down regulatory and 
accountability- focused approaches to addressing 
absenteeism.4 The latter assumes that most doctors are 
adhering to their contracts and the few who do not 
can be persuaded to do so using standard transpar-
ency and accountability measures, however these are 
not working in practice. Instead, we argue that under-
standing doctors’ preferences, and using this informa-
tion to design targeted interventions to influence their 
behaviour is potentially more effective. Our findings 
Figure 2 Predicted uptake of jobs for different groups under different policy settings.
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are broadly consistent with the limited existing liter-
ature that has investigated health worker absenteeism 
in Bangladesh and other low- income and middle- 
income nations, but the use of a DCE allowed us to 
assess differences between groups of doctors and iden-
tify a subset who appear to be motivated to be present 
at their places of work under certain conditions. Our 
findings do not negate the need for far- reaching 
measures to improve financing and delivery of health 
services in Bangladesh, underpinned by effective 
forms of developmental governance. However, even 
within existing constraints, our approach suggests that 
understanding the perspectives of doctors is a critical 
first step that can inform policy development and find 
improvements that work for them.
From previous literature,4 26 29 we hypothesised that 
a significant minority of doctors would be unwilling 
to accept rural placements even with targeted inter-
ventions to improve conditions; this was borne out in 
our data. Except under the most attractive (and most 
costly) conditions, a group of doctors consistently 
rejected rural posts. Nonetheless, we can now suggest a 
way of designing for differences to achieve enhanced levels 
of adherence. A substantial minority, almost half the 
cohort, appears willing to alter their decisions about 
job postings if the right conditions apply. By targeting 
this group and addressing drivers of particular struc-
tural reasons for absenteeism (such as safety of facili-
ties and fostering better relationships between doctors 
and the communities that they serve), it appears that 
attendance can be improved across the system through 
building a coalition of doctors for whom attendance is 
aligned with their own preferences. We think this will 
not only have a direct effect on attendance by those 
responding to these measures, but it will also create 
an environment in which violations by others are less 
likely to be tolerated. When motivation to adhere to 
health system rules (eg, being present at their rural 
primary health care (PHC) post) increases to levels 
where doctors who wish to serve their patients can do 
so without making huge personal sacrifices, a constit-
uency will be created that can exert peer pressure and 
support the imposition of sanctions on doctors who 
continue to be absent.
On the other hand, our results are also consistent with 
historical experience that biometric or other forms of 
monitoring have not been effective on their own. Large- 
scale absenteeism also means that peer group pressure 
is likely to be absent. Interestingly, doctors’ choices in 
the first latent class were not significantly influenced by 
the presence of the punishment attribute. This suggests 
that in addition to being unwilling to attend a rural 
post, this group may have had sufficient connections 
or power to prevent them from being threatened by 
enforcement mechanisms. Crucially, improving incen-
tives without understanding doctors’ heterogeneity may 
lead to excessively high levels of incentives (and imple-
mentation costs) that still fail to work. This is a novel but 
fundamentally important finding in the limited literature 
that has examined health worker absenteeism, which has 
tended to consider the problem and potential solutions 
as applying to a uniform set of workers.
While the use of financial incentives is familiar 
in the Bangladeshi health system as they have been 
used to encourage workers to take up posts in remote 
areas like the Chittagong Hill Tracts, feasible salary 
increases are unlikely to address other key drivers 
of absenteeism and thus, are unlikely to have a large 
enough impact to overcome absenteeism sustainably 
without other concurrent intervention. Our results 
demonstrate the potential benefits of non- financial 
incentives, with respondents willing to trade potential 
incentive payments of significant value in exchange 
for other job attributes. Many of the areas for inter-
vention we identified are not explicitly focused on 
absenteeism itself. Interventions that increase commu-
nity support for doctors (often relying on the support 
of powerful local elites, as shown in the qualitative 
study) and protect them from the threat of violence 
by service users, are likely to have many benefits for 
the health system. While we believe that the impor-
tance of non- financial incentives in addressing absen-
teeism is likely to be generalisable, the precise form 
that these interventions will take should be deter-
mined in the light of specific contexts, given that the 
particular issues we identified reflect characteristics of 
the society in which our respondents operated. Thus, 
when applying our findings elsewhere, further work 
will be needed to understand the wider environment 
within which people work and the power dynamics 
within and around the health system. Moreover, 
we have shown how a DCE can be used to derive a 
quantitative estimate of the importance of the issue 
to doctors and provided a method that can be repli-
cated in other settings. When coupled with qualitative 
studies, this will help to improve retention and job 
satisfaction among rural doctors.
Our study has several limitations. First, as with all DCEs, 
our results are based on respondents’ stated preferences 
rather than observing actual behaviour. If the stated 
choices differ from how the doctors would behave in prac-
tice our results could be biased. This could be a particular 
issue in an area as sensitive as absenteeism. We attempted 
to minimise the impact of such bias through a range of 
measures including an opt- out option, and an extensive 
attribute development process followed by piloting. This 
ensured that the attributes captured the key drivers of 
absenteeism and job characteristics valued by doctors 
and were clearly understood by participants. Second, due 
to resource constraints, our sample comprised doctors 
working in four large urban hospitals with recent expe-
rience of working at rural facilities, and thus may not 
be generaliseable to the broader doctor population. A 
significant portion of our sample had undertaken post-
graduate training already, which could impact the impor-
tance placed on the education attribute (if they thought 
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there was no further benefit available to them), however, 
we sought to make the attribute broad enough to apply to 
these doctors too and subgroup analysis for these doctors 
only and with them removed made no significant differ-
ence to the results (online supplemental appendix).
In conclusion, we were able to suggest a way to address 
absenteeism, a widespread problem undermining access 
to and quality of care in LMICs. Top- down regulatory 
and managerial approaches have had limited success. In 
contrast, we believe understanding the perspectives of 
the Bangladeshi doctors about the difficulties they face 
when working in rural areas and capturing their prefer-
ences on different aspects of their jobs can inform prag-
matic solutions to reduce absenteeism, which are largely 
feasible in the context of Bangladesh, and potentially of 
interest to other LMICs.
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